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Practicing phylogenetic systematics as a sophisticated falsification research program provides a basis 
for claiming increased knowledge of sister species relationships and synapomorphies as evidence for 
those cladistic propositions. Research in phylogenetic systematics is necessarily cyclic, and the place 
where the positive shift in understanding occurs is subsequent to discovering the most parsimonious 
cladogram(s). A priori differential character weighting is inconsistent with seeking the maximally 
corroborated cladogram (sensu Popper), because weighting adds to background knowledge, the 
evidence being then less improbable than it would be otherwise. Also, estimating weights from 
character state frequencies on a cladogram is inconsistent with the view that history is unique. 
Sophisticated falsification provides the place in the cycle of phylogenetic systematic research where 
weight of evidence can be evaluated and these inconsistencies do not apply. On balance, phylogenetic 
systematics appears to achieve greater coherence and generality as a result of focusing on the 
foundations for claiming increased knowledge and avoiding efforts to differentially weight charac- 
ters. 0 1998 The Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters 
Arnold G .  Kluge, Museum of Zoology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. U.S.A. 
Introduction 
Theories and methods of historical inference have been 
critically evaluated in the last 50 years, and by most 
accounts the coherence and generality of phylogenetic sys- 
tematics have increased as the result of these debates. Cur- 
rent controversies in phylogenetic inference include the 
application of maximum likelihood (Swofford et al. 1996) 
and three-taxon analysis (Nelson & Platnick 1991); 
however, there appear to be few novel issues and argu- 
ments in either of these challenges. Is maximum likelihood 
anything more than syncretism (the evolutionary sys- 
tematics of E. Mayr and G. G. Simpson; Mayr & Ashlock 
1991), with its emphasis on deterministic (evolutionary 
process) models, special knowledge, and verificationism? 
Is three-taxon analysis anything more than a revised form 
of phenetics (Sokal & Sneath 1963), that is, theory inde- 
pendent operationalism? Are there no more substantive 
challenges to phylogenetic systematics? 
In this paper, I expand on the idea that the day-to-day 
empirical science of cladistics is cyclic (Hennig 1966; Kluge 
1991). The published studies of many taxa suggest an iter- 
ative process is at work (e.g., Amniota; Eernisse & Kluge 
1993). Surely, no one doubts that there is traditional 
knowledge, that which comes from prior scientific study.‘ 
Popperian testability and sophisticated falsification, that 
‘Traditional knowledge is not to be confused with ‘conventional wisdom,’ 
that which does not have a scientific basis. 
which I review and relate to phylogenetic systematics, for- 
malize this perception. Further, the refutationist phil- 
osophy that all hypotheses are fallible, including 
observational propositions (so-called ‘facts’), indicates 
why cladistic research is necessarily cyclic. Significant 
consequences may yet follow from this conclusion. For 
example, the particular methods used in phylogenetic sys- 
tematics, and their accompanying arguments, must now be 
re-examined for logical consistency. Even widely favored 
methods, such as differential character weighting, cannot 
avoid being scrutinized. I expect my conclusions on weigh- 
ting, which are to follow, to be controversial, and so there 
is at least the prospect that the content and limits of phylo- 
genetic systematics may be critically evaluated, and 
changed if necessary. 
Testability, cladistic parsimony, and sophisticated 
falsification 
Popperian testability (Popper 1992; Farris 1995; see review 
by Kluge 1997) is a function of the logical interplay 
between evidence (e), hypothesis (h), and background 
knowledge (b). The logic plays out in two contexts, degree 
of corroboration and severity of test. 
Degree of corroboration, C, the degree of support given 
to h by e, in light of b, is defined as 
COl,e,b) = p(e,hb) - p(e,b)/p(e,W - p(eh,b) + p(e,b), 
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which in the numerator reads, the probability of e, given h 
and b, minus the probability of e on b alone. h receives 
a higher degree of corroboration the smaller p(e,b), in 
particular when p(e,b) << 1j2. Of course, e must be possible 
given b, but e should be improbable given b alone if h is to 
receive corroboration from e. 
Severity of test, S, the severity of the test e interpreted as 
supporting evidence of the theory h, given the background 
knowledge b, is defined as 
S(e,h,b) = p(e,hb) - p(e,b)/p(e,hb) + p(e,b). 
S follows directly from the inverse relationship which exists 
between the logical probability of h and its degree offal- 
sifiability. Expressed another way, there is a direct relation- 
ship between the logical improbability of h and its potential 
to be tested.’ Explanatory power and degree of cor- 
roboration can be said to increase together, because S is 
also the power of the hypothesis to explain the evidence. 
According to C, the maximum h can be corroborated is 
determined by the maximum it is testable. In turn, 
maximum testability is determined, in part, by the extent 
of the content of h, that is, by those qualities which deter- 
mine the amount of empirical information conveyed by h. 
The extent of the content of h is some function of the 
simplicity and clarity with which h can be described, and 
the higher the content of h the bolder h is said to be. 
Simpler hypotheses can also be considered to be objectively 
more informative, where informativeness is defined as the 
measurable extent to which the hypothesis alone answers 
questions about individuals in its domain. Thus, simplicity 
and boldness, amount of empirical content, and logical 
improbability all refer to degree of falsifiability, or test- 
ability, the potential to be tested. The amount of empirical 
content conveyed by a hypothesis increases with its degree 
of falsifiability. Informativeness is the failure to falsify that 
which is falsifiable, and that which is falsifiable relates to 
content. That a hypothesis must be tested by severe tests 
is the same as saying, given only b, that it must be subjected 
to those tests which are most likely to fail. Also, for h 
to be maximally corroborable, h must offer a variety of 
independent testable consequences. It is in this sense that 
independence relates to content. Still further, the 
maximum h is testable is inversely related to the number 
of assumptions made, in terms of the content of h relative 
to b. 
In practice, hypotheses are to be tested in the severest 
manner possible, in relation to their empirical content, and 
the degree to which a hypothesis has withstood those tests 
constitutes its degree of corroboration. A hypothesis is 
falsified if it has so far failed relevant tests. A hypothesis 
is accepted, but only tentatively, when it has withstood the 
most severe tests available, and when it has done better in 
that regard than any competing hypothesis. Falsification 
and corroboration comprise alternative results of testing. 
The number of tests performed does not relate directly to 
falsification or corroboration, because of the distinction 
between severe and weak tests. 
A hypothesis can never be disproven, however, even 
where deductive logic applies, because the disconfirming 
’Logical improbability = 1 ~ logical probability. 
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observational proposition itself is fallible. Thus, as a rule in 
a Popperian evaluation of scientific theories, the hypothesis 
which requires the ad hoc dismissal of the fewest falsifiers 
is preferred. In cladistics, the least refuted hypothesis is the 
most parsimonious cladogram that minimizes require- 
ments for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy (Farris 1983). 
Consequently, the content of the hypothesis is maximized, 
empty statements are minimized. And, it is the most par- 
simonious cladogram that achieves the highest degree of 
corroboration (C), because of the inverse relationship 
between ad hoc hypotheses and explanatory power (S). 
The potential to maximize explanatory power, that is, 
being able to provide an explanation for the shared derived 
traits as due to inheritance, is a consequence of minimizing 
requirements for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy. 
Precisely, the more homoplasies required of a phylogenetic 
hypothesis, the more evidence it fails to explain as due 
to inheritance. Again, in strictly Popperian terms, most 
parsimonious cladograms are most explanatory, because 
both C and S increase with p(e,hb), a term that occurs 
in their shared numerator. Thus, we have the logic of 
parsimony analysis in cladistics and its relationship to a 
Popperian evaluation of scientific theories. 
There is, however, more to claiming increased knowl- 
edge than operationalizing Popperian testability with 
cladistic parsimony. Falsification must be “sophisticated” 
(Lakatos 1993: 116), in the sense that there is an interplay 
between evidence (e) and competing hypotheses 
(h,,h2,h3, ... hn) that “leads to the discovery of novel facts.” 
Such a progressive problem shift indicates a situation in 
which h2 suggests something more than h, suggested, as 
well as suggesting more than is required by the data them- 
selves. A progressive problem shift cannot come from max- 
imizing C(h,e,b) alone. 
The cyclic nature of cladistics research 
Most taxa have been studied previously and with various 
kinds of data, and such published prior research cannot 
be omitted from new cladistic studies. To overlook prior 
hypotheses relevant to one’s research shows a lack of schol- 
arship; to purposely ignore them without cause is auth- 
oritarian. The number of possible cladistic hypotheses for 
a given set of taxa (hl,h2,h3, ... hn) is not the problem, pre- 
suming the parsimony algorithm employed is effective at 
finding the maximally corroborated cladogram(s). The 
issue is how honestly the relevant data are surveyed for 
those synapomorphies that actually have the potential to 
refute a cladistic hypothesis, those synapomorphies that 
can count as independent ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy. 
To test both cladograms and synapomorphies over and 
over again is consistent with Popperian testability, and it 
is in such cycles of research that hypotheses will be critically 
re-evaluted. Excluding prior evidence from an analysis 
reduces the content of h and severity of test, and these 
omissions are also expected to be revealed with repeated 
critical review. 
Realistically, cladistics is a plexus of research cycles. The 
complexity is due to the fact that testable phylogenetic 
hypotheses occur at different levels of taxonomic inclus- 
iveness, and because cladistic research often identifies par- 
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aphyletic assemblages, which then must be reclassified 
monophyletically. The many kinds of data and the rec- 
ognition that the data used to test competing phylogenetic 
propositions are themselves fallible hypotheses requiring 
reanalysis, and possibly reinterpretation, also contribute 
to the complex nature of phylogenetic systematic research. 
Figure 1 summarizes the more general aspects involved 
inone rotation of the cycle. Phase A is all of the scholarship 
which leads to the familiar taxon by character matrix. 
Identifying terminal taxa (species or more inclusive clades), 
selecting organisms representative of those taxa, and 
delimiting the synapomorphies which constitute potential 
evidence are the principle operations. Preliminarily testing 
the monophyly of each terminal taxon means that phase 
A is itself potentially cyclic. Monophyletic terminal taxa 
are critical, because they omit the possible patterns of 
character generality which can serve as evidence. The 
characters summarized in phase A are of two kinds: (1) 
newly discovered generalities (observed and recorded for 
the first time), and (2) those synapomorphies used in pre- 
vious research. The latter characters to some degree have 
more corroborated content, to the extent they have been 
tested (phase B), reanalyzed and possibly reinterpreted 
(phase C). The organisms on which the observations are 
made are not chosen at random. Rather, they are selected 
for the unambiguous evidence they provide as to the plesio- 
morphic condition of a terminal taxon. 
Some students of phylogenetic inference have argued 
that character compatibility, testing characters indi- 
vidually, against each other, for their self-consistency (Wil- 
son 1965; Le Quesne 1969), should be used in the 
identification of potentially informative characters (phase 
A). However, character compatibility cannot be endorsed 
at any place in the cycle of cladistics research, because: (1) 
excluding characters according to their incompatibilities is 
a form of verificationist weighting (see below); (2) com- 
patibility/clique analysis (Le Quesne 1969) does not necess- 
arily maximize explanatory power (Kluge 1976); (3) the 
pair-wise character tests of compatibility are not as severe 
as when all those tests are conducted simultaneously with 
cladistic parsimony (Kluge 1997). 
Phase B (Fig. 1) is where all of the possible cladograms 
(h,,h2,h3, ... hn) are tested simultaneously with a set of poten- 
tially disconfirming synapomorphies (e), in light of back- 
ground knowledge (b). The more the competing 
cladograms are severely tested and refuted the better. No 
phase B operation assesses the truth of a hypothesis of 
species relationships, or measures the accuracy of the evi- 
dence. It is of course phase B where cladistic parsimony is 
applied in the minimization of requirements for ad hoc 
hypotheses of homoplasy. “Descent with modification” as 
necessary and sufficient background knowledge peculiar 
to phylogenetic inference has been discussed elsewhere 
(Kluge 1997). 
There are many activities in phylogenetic scystematics 
that address the relationship between maximally cor- 
roborated hypotheses and evidence; however, only those 
scientific tests which lead to a progressive problem shift 
constitute phase C (Fig. 1). To be sure, increasing the 
empirical content of cladistic hypotheses and/or min- 
imizing ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy may justify 
character reanalysis. However, it is only in the sense that 
a maximally corroborated hypothesis (h2) suggests some- 
thing more than a competing proposition (h,) suggested, 
as well as suggesting more than is required by the data 
themselves, that there can be a positive increase in the 
selecting terminal taxa 
and identifying synapomorphies 
increased knowledge of taxa b\y character 
sophisticated cladoaram - 
falsification corroborated cladogram(s) testing 
Fig. I .  A graphic outline of the cyclic nature of cladistics research. A complete round (A-C) is but one part of a more complicated pattern of testing 
hypotheses of sister group relationships and synapomorphy relations. See text for further explanation. 
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knowledge of phylogeny and synapomorphies. None of 
the phase C operations assesses the truth of a hypothesis 
of species relationships, or measures the accuracy of the 
evidence-all data are ‘observational propositions’ which 
are fallible in themselves 
At least tests of consilience and some kinds of character 
reanalysis meet the conditions of sophisticated falsification 
(Lakatos 1993). Consilience offers especially severe tests 
(sensu Popper 1992), and which therefore should be an 
important part of phylogenetic systematic research. Tests 
of consilience involve the search for incongruence between 
the maximally corroborated cladogram(s) discovered in 
phase B and the branching patterns provided by earth 
history and parasite (or host) phylogenetic hypotheses 
(Kluge 1983). According to Kluge (1997), whatever 
congruence is observed between the maximally cor- 
roborated cladogram(s) and earth history and/or parasite 
(or host) phylogenetic hypotheses it is more improbable 
than observing an equally large set of congruent syn- 
apomorphies. The greater improbability derives from the 
fact that vicariance biogeography and host-parasite 
coevolution allow for both temporally (vertically) and spa- 
tially (horizontally) evolved patterns, whereas cladistic 
analysis only presupposes the former (Sober 1988a). Thus, 
the reanalyses of those synapomorphies responsible for the 
incongruence between the maximally corroborated cla- 
dogram(s) and the patterns provided by earth history and 
parasite (or host) phylogenetic hypotheses are of special 
interest. 
Hypotheses of character state polarity and similarity 
(including sequence alignment) and assumptions of 
character independence are the particular concerns of 
character reanalysis (e.g., see Jones et al. 1993). Many 
different strategies have been used to identify characters for 
reanalysis, including consilience, and it is unclear whether 
there is a logical order to their empIoyment. One approach 
is to focus the reanalysis on the characters diagnostic of 
those clades which are relatively weakly corroborated, as 
determined by unweighted branch support (Bremer 1994; 
not the weighted support of Gustafsson & Bremer 1995). 
Another approach, although not commonly employed, 
involves the reanalysis of the disconfirming evidence, 
because minimizing requirements for ad hoc hypotheses of 
homoplasy is the criterion for identifying the most par- 
simonious cladogram(s). As Farris (1983: 10) emphasized, 
“[ilf external evidence favors the interpretation of homo- 
plasy, ... that hypothesis is not ad hoc.” The external 
evidence, I conjecture, is that which comes from character 
reanalysis. “Scrutiny of a structure may indicate that what 
had been regarded as a single feature is instead the union 
of distinct qualities. Sometimes conflicts can be removed 
by changing hypotheses of plesiomorphy, and surveying 
the distribution of a feature among taxa may provide sup- 
port for such a reinterpretation. If a conflicting character 
survives all attempts to remove it by searching for such 
evidence, then the conclusion of homoplasy in that charac- 
ter, required by selecting a placement, satisfies the usual 
definition of an ad hoc hypothesis” (Farris 1983: 10). An 
incongruence which can only be judged an investigator 
error cannot be counted as an ad hoc hypothesis. It only 
deserves to be recoded. 
Other phase C activiiies may include manipulating lin- 
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eages in a reticulate pattern, in order to determine if a 
hybrid origin explains the data more parsimoniously (Nel- 
son 1983), and transformation series analysis (Mickevich 
1982), where hypotheses of character state adjacency are 
tested (Lipscomb 1992; see also Mickevich & Lipscomb 
1991). 
It is certainly a truism that not all characters yield equ- 
ally strong evidence of phylogenetic relationships (Farris 
1983: 11); however, the issues of how those weights are to 
be formulated and where in the cycle of cladistic research 
they are to be applied remain hotly debated topics (e.g., 
Goloboff 1995). The following discussion indicates that 
there are logical and analytical problems when differential 
character weights are applied in the process of discovering 
the maximally corroborated cladogram (phase B); 
however, sophisticated falsification (phase C )  seems to pro- 
vide an appropriate ‘how and where’ for judging weight of 
evidence3 (see also Turner & Zandee 1995). For example, 
the evidence responsible for equally most parsimonious 
hypotheses (secondary cladograms) would be evaluated in 
phase C (e.g., with character reanalysis), not in phase B 
(e.g., with a posterior [successive] character weighting). 
Character weighting: an overview 
Three kinds of differential character weighting are recog- 
nized according to when the weights are applied. There are 
the familiar a priori and a posteriori kinds of weighting, 
which are determined immediately before and immediately 
after phase B (Fig. l), respectively. A priori applications 
include those based on character compatibility (e.g., Le 
Quesne 1969, 1972; Gauld & Underwood 1987; Moody & 
O’Nolan 1987; Sharkey 1989) and relative rate tests (e.g., 
Mindell & Thacker 1996). Successive weighting (Farris 
1969; Carpenter 1988, 1994) exemplifies the most often 
used objective a posteriori application. In addition, there 
is the less well known character weighting within phase B, 
that which Goloboff (1993) has used as the basis for his 
new optimality criterion for choosing among competing 
cladograms. 
All of the justifications for differential character weigh- 
ting, whenever determined, immediately before or after, or 
during, phase B (Fig. l), follow a verificationist agenda- 
the application of weights supposedly improve one’s 
chances of discovering objective truth, the phylogeny 
(Mindell 1997). Weighting under any such guise negatively 
impacts C and S ,  either by adding to b, or by reducing the 
empirical content of h. 
The details of the arguments for differential character 
weighting vary considerably. For example, there is the 
simple proposition that no one supposes that all characters 
deserve the same weight. that is, that they all provide 
equally strong evidence in phylogenetic inference. Then 
there is the notion of conservatism in systematics, the more 
conservative the character the better. In the older litera- 
ture, character conservatism was simply related to specu- 
lations on homology and homoplasy, the more instances 
~ ~ 
3I believe this distinction deserves the different terminologies employed, 
‘differential character weighting’ and ‘weight of evidence.’ 
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of independent evolution one imagined a character to have, 
the less ‘reliable’ it was considered to be.4 The dis- 
continuous nature of the historical record may also have 
given license to the idea that relative constancy is impor- 
tant in characters if they are to track that record accurately. 
Appeals to special knowledge concerning characters (e.g., 
Hecht & Edwards 1977), while common in the older litera- 
ture, have been soundly rejected by phylogenetic sys- 
tematists (e.g., Kluge 1994). 
All of the more objective arguments for differential 
character weighting in phylogenetic systematics appear to 
be based on conservatism-constancy, which involve ref- 
erences to rate-related within population (or t a ~ a ) ~  vari- 
ation or character reliability. Farris’ (1966) within 
population basis for weighting has only rarely been put 
into practice (e.g., Kluge 1969), even though it was restated 
in terms of taxa (Kluge & Farris 1969). Sober’s (1986) 
theoretical argument that frequencies of traits in popu- 
lations are not good descriptors of taxa appears to be 
contradicted by the empirical findings of Kluge & Kerfoot 
(1973), which illustrate a reasonably good correspondence 
between amounts of within and between population vari- 
ation. The within taxon approach has been applied most 
recently to molecular data (Mindell & Thacker 1996). 
Character reliability methods have come to predominate 
in cladistics; in spite of opposing points of view as to 
the relationship between parsimony and weighting. For 
example, Sober (1986: 28) argued that “[plarsimony is not 
a device that tells biologists how to weight characters; 
rather, parsimony requires that the characters already 
should be weighted.” The arguments advanced by many 
prominent phylogenetic systematists for believing there is 
a direct relationship between parsimony and weighting are 
summarized in the following historical review. 
Reliability weighting: historical digressions 
Old history 
An evolutionary basis for character reliability weighting in 
classification seems to have originated with Darwin (1 859: 
415), who stated that the importance of organs “depends 
on their greater constancy throughout large groups of spec- 
ies; and this constancy depends on such organs having 
generally been subjected to less change in the adaptation 
of the species to their conditions of life.” 
The idea of a constancy relation to information content 
was introduced into phylogenetic systematics by Farris 
1966,1970a. It must be remembered that pheneticists (e.g., 
4The terms precision, reliability, and accuracy are all too often used 
loosely in discussions of differential character weighting. In this paper I 
take precision to mean exactness, being definite, clear, and unambiguous 
(Kluge 1998) and reliability and accuracy to mean conformity to truth 
(Farris 1969: 374-376). 
’These are not to be confused with the pheneticists’ between OTU 
methods which formed the basis for their claims of equal character 
weighting. 
6The current literature is rife with many different kinds of character 
reliability applications, such as character state transformation weights 
(Williams & Fitch 1989), combinatorial weights in molecular sequence 
data (Wheeler 1990), and character state weighting based on asymmetrical 
step-matrices (Albert et al. 1992). 
Sokal & Sneath 1963: 118-120) advocated weighting 
characters according to their constancy between oper- 
ational taxonomic units (OTUs), which was termed ‘equal 
weighting,’ and they were otherwise critical of weighting. 
Farris 1966 responded effectively to their position with 
an argument for a priori differential character weighting 
according to a character’s variation within discrete bio- 
logical populations, as measured by the sample variance. 
The connection he developed between within-OTU varia- 
bility, evolutionary rate, and weighting was summarized 
by Kluge & Farris (1969: 4): “The rate at which a character 
can change in evolution is necessarily limited by the varia- 
bility of the character within populations. Selection, no 
matter how intense, cannot change the average character 
state of a population in some unit time by a greater amount 
than the range of values available in the population in that 
unit time. If a character has high variability within OTUs, 
then a large difference between two OTUs does not imply 
lack of close relationship, since the variable character could 
have changed rapidly. If on the other hand, a character 
has low variability within OTUs, then a large. difference 
between OTUs is probably indicative of lack of close 
relationship, since the highly stable character probably 
could not evolve rapidly. Hence, in drawing taxonomic 
conclusions, we place greater weight on characters with 
low variability within OTUs.” Farris (1966: 589) was care- 
ful to point out that the “problem of avoiding error due 
to convergence is quite distinct from that of finding con- 
servative characters” at any rank, a convergent character 
being unreliable for taxonomic purposes “even though it 
is conservative according to the criterion of constancy 
within populations.” 
Successive (iterative, a posteriori) character weighting 
also appears to have connections to the constancy concept. 
For example, according to Farris (1966: 587), there is “little 
doubt that if a character is constant throughout a group 
that is natural in an evolutionary sense, then that character 
is a more reliable indicator of evolutionary relationship 
than is a character that varies widely in the same group.” 
In any case, the concept of character reliability, as mea- 
sured in terms of self-consistency, became central to his 
development of successive weighting (Farris 1969; see also 
Goloboff 1993: 85). For example, (p. 374), “[clharacters 
that are reliable for cladistic inference are those that are 
consistent with the true phyletic relationships, that is, those 
that have little homoplasy.” Further, in completing this 
theoretical basis for successive weighting, he assumed that 
“[s]everal unreliable characters will each vary from the 
phylogeny in its own random way, and chances are very 
slight that a series of random variables will by accident 
form a pseudo-hierarchic pattern of variation” (p. 376). 
His ingredients for operationalizing cladistic reliability 
were the unit character consistency index (cii; see Kluge & 
Farris 1969) and the hierarchic correlation of a set of 
characters. That a “set of variables with high hierarchic 
correlation will all be highly consistent with a single bran- 
ching pattern” was the defining property of hierarchic 
correlation, and from which it followed that “cladistically 
reliable characters are hierarchically correlated with each 
other” (p. 376); “cladistically reliable characters [have] 
high unit character consistency with the true cladistic 
relationships of the group under study” (p. 375). And 
Zoologica Scripta 26 
354 A .  G.  Kluge 
finally, Farris concluded that (p. 377) “successive tree esti- 
mates and consistency estimates [the unbounded concave 
weight function being recommended] will become pro- 
gressively better until the process terminates at the correct 
phylogenetic tree. ’ ’ 
Farris (1988: 19; see also Carpenter 1988) also noted 
that successive weighting was useful in reducing “the ambi- 
guity of complex data sets: there may be many trees of 
minimal length without weighting, but substantially fewer 
with successive weights.” Of course, removing ambiguity 
in the results will also be sought in phase C (Fig. l), with, 
for example, character reanalysis, and there appear to be 
some examples of successive weighting actually increasing 
the number of secondary cladograms (J. Wenzel, pers. 
comm.). Ambiguity in the individual, potentially dis- 
confirming, synapomorphies is error which is expected to 
have been removed prior to phase A (Fig. 1). 
New history 
Carpenter (1988: 292; see also Carpenter et al. 1993: 137- 
138) appears to have been the first to argue that Farris’ 
(Farris 1969,1988) successive weighting method “is related 
to evidential support”, because that “method 
is developed directly from the concept of ‘cladistic relia- 
bility’ ”. Curiously, Carpenter (1988: 292) cited only 
Farris 1983 (not Farris 1966, 1969, or 1970a) as the basis 
for his rationale for successive weighting, the salient quote 
being “No one supposes ... that characters in general all 
deserve the same weight-that they all yield equally strong 
evidence” (Farris 1983: 11). Such a citation is especially 
curious, because the rationale in this quote provides no 
reason for endorsing cladistic reliability in particular as a 
basis for weighting. 1 believe Farris’ more general state- 
ment should not have been so over-interpreted, because he 
does not appear to have been arguing the issues of weigh- 
ting per se (pp. 10-12). Rather, he seems to have been 
making the case for parsimony being necessary oper- 
ationally in assessing requirements for ad hoc hypotheses 
of homoplasy. For example, as Farris concluded (p. 1 l), 
even “the characters comprising a congruent suite are 
hardly observed to be free of homoplasy” (my italics). 
A further questionable modification of Farris’ (Farris 
1966, 1969, 1970a) conceptualization of cladistic reliability 
is evident in a more recent paper by Carpenter (Carpenter 
1994; see also Carpenter et al. 1993). To begin with, Car- 
penter’s (Carpenter 1994: 216) reference to reliability being 
“an extension of parsimony” (my italics) is unjustified-as 
is his conclusion: “Successive weighting allows the charac- 
ters of a given data set to judge themselves in terms of their 
reliability; that is best fit to the solution supported by all 
the characters. Homoplastic characters, being less reliable, 
are down-weighted, hence successive weighting employs 
evidence that would otherwise be discarded ...” Actually, 
the modification seems to have originated in the earlier 
papers to which Carpenter 1994 referred, namely in Carp- 
enter (1988: 292), and in Farris & Kluge 1979, which he 
cited therein. In fact, Farris & Kluge (1979: 402) stated 
unambiguously that Farris 1969’ successive weighting 
techniques were used “in conjunction with parsimony 
methods” (my italics; see also Kluge & Farris 1969; Farris 
1983: 10). Those authors did not, nor did Farris 1983, 
claim that cladistic reliability is an extension of parsimony. 
As I see it, parsimony is simply the operation of optimizing 
on a criterion. 
Unfortunately, Carpenter’s error has been compounded. 
For example, Goloboff (1993: 83) has now concluded “that 
parsimony does not preclude weighting, but rather that it 
requires weighting.” Such a novel position, in turn, has led 
Agosti et aE. (1996: 79-80) to assert that “[c]onsequently, 
given the logical necessity or requirement of character 
weighting, methods for accomplishing objective character 
weights are highly desirable.” There are substantial down- 
sides to this misadventure. As Carpenter’s (Carpenter 
1994: 21 7-21 8) own review indicates, cladistic parsimony 
continues to be criticized unnecessarily for its presumed 
dependence on deterministic evolutionary models, like 
those justifying character reliability. That is, following 
from the discussion above, reliability weighting requires a 
model of conservatism or slow rates of change. 
Goloboff 1993’s required, “heaviest” tree, weighting cri- 
terion deserves careful review, because it significantly chan- 
ges the basis for determining maximally comoborated 
cladistic hypotheses (phase B in Fig. 1). Like successive 
weighting, Goloboffs criterion uses hypotheses of homo- 
plasy to estimate character reliability. In addition, it max- 
imizes total fit, the sum of the fits of the characters among 
all possible trees, the cladogram with highest total fit being 
chosen. The heaviest tree criterion is not iterative (unlike 
successive weighting); it evaluates character consistency 
one cladogram at a time (not across multiple equally most 
parsimonious hypotheses, like successive weighting); rela- 
tive weights are determined by the ratio of the fit slopes to 
a concave function, A = (k + I)/(s, + k +  1 - mJ7 (not, as in 
successive weighting, by the ratio of the fits themselves); 
the fitting functions exhibit, at least in theory, precision to 
two or three significant digits (not the 0-10 integer scale 
employed by Farris 1988); and, most challenging to phylo- 
genetic systematic principles, it produces trees which are 
maximally “reliable”, but which are not necessarily most 
parsimonious (of minimum length; sensu Kluge & Farris 
1969, Farris 19706, and Farris et al. 1970). The latter 
departure from traditional cladistic practice is justified by 
Goloboff (1993: 88) on the grounds that the best hypoth- 
esis, for a given set of data, “is the one which confers the 
highest weight on the data. Searching for the “heaviest” 
trees, therefore, is in direct agreement with cladistic ideas, 
and provides what self-consistency alone did not.” Thus, 
Goloboff has reinterpreted explanatory power (Farris 
1983), the relationship between evidence and competing 
hypotheses, as a weighted explanatory power, but for 
which he has given no further rationale than the premise 
of fit increase itself. 
Explanatory power is also weighted under Farris 1969’s 
successive weighting criterion when it decides among equ- 
ally most parsimonious cladograms, the chosen hypoth- 
esis(es) being longer (of increased weighted length). When 
successive weighting points to a different topology, as it 
does occasionally, explanatory power has also been trans- 
formed. 
’k = constant for degree of concavity; s = minimum number of steps a 
character can exhibit on the cladogram; m = minimum number of steps 
a character can exhibit on any cladogram (the one where there are no 
requirements for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy). 
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Differential character weighting: criticisms 
I believe all ordinary uses of differential character weigh- 
ting in phylogenetic systematics, including all forms of 
reliability weighting, must be called into question. Of par- 
ticular importance to this conclusion is the verificationist 
justification which accompanies differential character 
weighting. Also, the uniqueness of history is logically 
inconsistent with frequency as a basis for defining “good” 
and “bad” characters (Siddall & Kluge 1997; see however 
Lauder 1982: 65, Lauder 1990: 332). And, as will be dis- 
cussed below, at least some forms of frequency weighting 
can affect the independence of tests. 
Obviously, the terms a priori and a posteriori weighting 
belie the cyclic nature of cladistic research, and for which 
more appropriate, atemporal, labels are required. Further, 
what has been called a priori differential weighting cannot 
be employed if cladistics is to retain its refutationist charac- 
ter. According to Popperian testability, a cladistic hypoth- 
esis receives corroboration from synapomorphies only to 
the degree that the evidence is improbable given the back- 
ground knowledge alone. A priori differential character 
weighting adds to the background knowledge and 
decreases the improbability of a hypothesis in light of its 
tests. Adding to background knowledge is a verificationist 
slippery slope, which ultimately ends in tautology. That is 
any cladogram can be supported on the basis of some 
arbitrarily chosen a priori weighting scheme. Popperian 
testability only requires that each character in the data 
matrix provides an independent, potentially disconfirming, 
test. Independently evolved homoplasious characters are 
of equal weight in this sense of test. 
Character reliability is measured as some function of the 
total number of steps a character exhibits over the entire 
cladogram. Those extra steps required to explain the data 
are ordinarily counted as requirements for ad hoc hypoth- 
eses of homoplasy, independent evolution due to some 
biological process, deterministic or stochastic. Investigator 
error can also result in the same apparent pattern and 
interpretation (Farris 1969: 374), and it may be argued 
that those incongruences should also be down-weighted, 
because they might confound the discovery of the true 
phylogeny. But fallibility does not specify why something 
is fallible. If error were distinguisable, a correction would 
have been undertaken prior to phase B (Fig. 1). As Kluge 
& Farris (1969) pointed out, so-called apparent homoplasy 
may result from an injudicious coding of characters. 
A further complication is the fact that the cladogram 
over which the homoplasy is counted is limited to the 
terminal taxa in the data matrix, which does not take 
account of the character evolution which has occurred 
more globally or which has taken place within terminal 
taxa. Thus, at best, a suite of weights can constitute only 
a crude hypothesis on frequencies of incongruence due to 
supposed homoplasy and/or investigator error. 
Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of self-consistency 
weights and how they affect hypothesis choice. Assume all 
parts of the cladogram in Fig. 2-A, except the relation- 
ships among terminal taxa A-C, are highly corroborated 
by unique and unreversed synapomorphies. The 
accompanying three characters (1-3) provide evidence for 
equally parsimonious hypotheses of relationships among 
taxa A-C weighted by overall fit. Characters 1 and 2 exhi- 
bit a minimum of four steps each, and unit character con- 
sistency index (cil-J of 0.25, whereas character 3 has a 
minimum of two steps, and a consistency index (ciJ of 
0.50. The weighted evidence supports equally well the alter- 
native hypotheses (A,B) and (B,C), the strict consensus of 
which is the unresolved (A,B,C) clade. All of the minimum 
extra steps contributing to the ambiguity in the evidence 
come from the recovered (F(G(H(I(J,K))))) part of the 
cladogram, which is historically independent of those apo- 
morphies in (((A,B,C)D)E). If the relationships of the 
(A,B,C,D,E) cIade were to have been studied more 
narrowly, without the more global reference to the 
relationships in the (F,G,H,I,J,K) clade, then 
(((A,B)C)D,E) would have been the best supported, com- 
pletely resolved, cladogram (Fig. 2-A’). This example, 
and any number of others (e.g., Fig. 3), demonstrates that 
self-consistency weighting presupposes a character that 
behaves badly in one part of the cladogram, for whatever 
reason, must do so as well elsewhere in the cladogram. But 
why must that be so? Aren’t characters 1 and 2 maximally 
congruent when examined over terminal taxa A-E, and 
isn’t there twice as much support for the (A,B) clade (Fig. 
As noted earlier, Goloboff (1993) used character self- 
consistency weighting within phase B of the cladistics 
research cycle as an optimality criterion for choosing 
among cladograms. His criterion gives greater weight to 
characters more consistent with tree(s), and it is the heav- 
iest cladogram which is considered optimal. The basis for, 
and the problems associated with, this approach are illus- 
trated with four sets of examples (Fig. 3-A-D). In Fig. 
3-A-A, assume that the ingroup and outgroup histories 
and the distribution of twomcharacters, one highly variable, 
the other much more conservative. There are equally par- 
simonious ingroup clades, (A,B)C and (A,C)B, each with 
a minimum of ten steps for the two characters scored. 
However, according to Goloboff s criterion, the former 
hypothesis is preferred, because it confers more weight 
(1.11 1) than the latter (0.625). Hypothesis (A,C)B confers 
less weight (Fig. 3-A’), because its confirming character 
is more variable among the outgroups. In Fig. 3-B-B’, 
assume the ingroup and outgroup histories and the dis- 
tribution of two characters, one being only slightly more 
conservative than the other. There are equally par- 
simonious ingroup clades, (AB)C and (AC)B, each with 
a minimum of four steps for the two characters scored. 
However, according to Goloboff s criterion, the former 
hypothesis is preferred, because it receives more weight 
(1.333) than the latter (1.000). Hypothesis (A,C)B receives 
less weight (Fig. 3-B’), because its confirming character 
is more variable among the outgroups. 
Obviously, the conclusion in Fig. 3 4 - C ’  is quite 
different. Here, the longer, less parsimonious, cladogram, 
(A,B)C with 19 steps, is considered optimal under Golo- 
boff s criterion, because it has greater character weight 
(1.222). Although the alternative hypothesis, (A,C)B, is 
more parsimonious, with 18 steps, it receives less weight 
(0.750), because its confirming character is more variable 
among the outgroups. Fig. 3-D-D’ is a similar example, 
where the less parsimonious ingroup hypothesis is 
preferred, because of variation in the outgroup taxa. How- 
2-A’)? 
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Fig. 2. An example of differential character weighting (modified after M. Siddall, pers. comm.). The cladogram in panel A is given. The self-consistency 
weights for the three characters in panel A are responsible for the equally parsimonious relationships, (A,B) and (B,C), which are summarized as a 
trichotomy. Panel A‘ illustrates the resolved most parsimonious relationships based on the unweighted characters. See text for further explanation. 
ever, this example is noteworthy, because there is nothing 
in the weights of the individual characters that would sug- 
gest the most parsimonous hypothesis (Fig. 3-D’). 
Goloboff (1 993: 88) acknowledged that longer cla- 
dograms can be optimal under his self-consistency weigh- 
ting criterion (Fig. 1, phase B), and argued that 
“[s]earching for “heaviest” trees.. .is in direct agreement 
with cladistic ideas, and provides what self-consistency 
alone did not”. Still, those less parsimonious weighted 
hypotheses are more ad hoc-they explain the original 
observations less well-an observation which Carpenter 
(1988: 291-292) appears to have used to reject Brooks et 
al. 1986’s D measure as a weighting criterion. The bottom 
line is that if a weighted cladogram is different from the 
most parsimonious unweighted hypothesis, then the trans- 
formations on the former proposition are overall necess- 
arily more ad hoc than those on the latter. That is, in the 
former, there will necessarily be more instances of change. 
The frequentist interpretation of character state 
incongruence is an obvious problem for differential charac- 
ter weighting.* On the face of it, there is a logical con- 
tradiction; namely, states which are hypothesized as 
incongruent cannot then be counted as historically the 
same. The acquisitions, or losses, of character states which 
are hypothesized to have occurred within exclusive clades 
represent instances of independent evolution. In an appar- 
ent attempt to counter this problem for incongruence, 
Goloboff (1993: 84; see also Goloboff 1995) assumed that 
characters are differentially committed to homoplasy: 
“characters which have failed repeatedly to adjust to the 
expectation of hierarchic correlation are more likely to fail 
again in the future, and so they are less likely to predict 
‘This also applies to Sober 1988b’s Smith-Quackdoodle theorem 
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accurately the distribution of as yet unobserved charac- 
ters.” But, such an assumption presupposes a general 
underlying biological process, or a general character con- 
dition responsible for error in observation or coding, which 
like a priori weighting obviously adds to background 
knowledge and decreases degree of corroboration. More- 
over, that general biological process is as yet unspecified, 
and as such can’t be tested. In any case, where could the 
evidence for the process come from, if not from a cladistic 
analysis where self-consistency weighting is absent? I see 
no reason to pretend that a set of non-homologs forms a 
natural class justifying prediction. 
Prediction and postdiction (retrodiction) are often con- 
fused in historical biology. Strictly speaking, the former 
extends only from intensionally defined classes, the latter 
being descriptive of ostensively or extensionally defined 
historical individuals (Frost & Kluge 1994). The import- 
ance of the confusion is exemplified by Goloboff (1993: 
84), where there is no evidentiary justification for the “pre- 
diction” he makes concerning homoplastic characters. The 
subtlety in the distinction between prediction and post- 
diction in phylogenetic inference can be illustrated with a 
simple example (largely due to P. Goloboff, pers. comm.). 
Imagine encountering a live spider. You determine that it 
has all of the external features diagnostic of a group that 
is also known to possess venom which is lethal to humans. 
How do you handle the spider, without actually deter- 
mining the toxicity of its venom and observing its biting 
behavior when it is disturbed? Does membership in such a 
group actually predict the spider in question is deadly, 
which then demands extreme care in handling the organ- 
ism? Even assuming the spider has been correctly deter- 
mined to be a part of a group all of whose others’ bite is 
known to be lethal, there remain two possibilities: either 
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Fig. 3. Four sets of alternative results (panels A-A; B-B’; C-C;  D-D) illustrating the relationship between self-consistency weights and most 
parsimonious cladograms (modified after M. Sorenson, pers. comm.). In panels A-A‘ and B-B’ the more heavily weighted cladogram is also one of 
the most parsimonious alternatives. In panels C-C’ and D-D’ the more heavily weighted cladogram is not a most parsimonious hypothesis. See text 
for further explanation. 
the spider’s venom is lethal, or it is not, extreme toxicity 
being absent (meaning secondarily reduced, or lost alto- 
gether, in this part of arachnid history). To ignore the 
latter possibility is to be anti-evolutionary, or to deny the 
possibility of teratology. Ignoring these alternatives may 
also be judged unscientific. Scientists are engaged in exam- 
ining alternative possibilities, not presupposing the 
impossible. That you use long forceps to collect the spider, 
whether or not it is benign, does not validate the notion of 
phylogenetic classification being predictive. Rather, prac- 
tically speaking, it costs you little, if anything, to play it 
safe. 
Lastly, there is the issue that weighting can affect inde- 
pendence. If weights are based on distributional values 
(e.g., base compositions, TV:TI ratios) across all characters 
or across a character class (3rd positions) then inde- 
pendence of these potential falsifiers is lost (M. Siddall, 
pers. comm.). If in successive weighting it is the consistency 
of other characters which determines the inconsistency of 
the down-weighted characters, then again there is loss of 
independence. Apparently, only if weights were to be 
applied arbitrarily would character independence be 
retained. 
Discussion 
Obviously, it is important for scientists to pursue increased 
knowledge. Surely in time, for example, interest in phylo- 
genetics would decline without real progress in under- 
standing species relationships and explaining 
synapomorphies as either homologous or homoplasious. 
Hennig 1 966’s principle of reciprocal clarification signaled 
the need to demonstrate progress in cladistics, but his ideas 
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-continued. 
have yet to be developed beyond the obvious (e.g., re- 
examining character states for their similarity and polarity; 
Kluge 1991). As well, attempts to identify important oper- 
ations and order them one to another have yet to suggest 
a convincing basis for claiming increased knowledge in 
phylogenetic systematics (Neff 1986: figs 1-4). But matters 
are even worse in verificationist research programs, such 
as those employing maximum likelihood (Swofford et al. 
1996), because there is no incentive to critically re-examine 
the resulting hypothesis, the original evidence, or the 
assumed process-model of evolution. In fact, the maximum 
likelihood method itself does not produce diagnoses or 
particular hypotheses of character transformation which 
can be used as the basis for character reanalysis. The induc- 
tionist agenda of maximum likelihood only seems to 







and the formulation of more complex, assumption laden, 
models. Surely, this is not the nature of science. 
I have attempted to show in this paper that practicing 
phylogenetic inference as a sophisticated falsificationist 
research program (Lakatos 1993) provides a foundation 
for claiming increased knowledge. Research is necessarily 
cyclic, and the severe testing of phylogenetic hypotheses 
and evidence leading to a positive shift in understanding 
actually occurs subsequent to discovering maximally cor- 
roborated cladogram(s) (sensu Popper 1992). However, 
sophisticated falsification and research cycles expose other 
problems, such as the inconsistency of differential charac- 
ter weighting. To be sure, weighting has had a long history 
in phylogenetic inference, but its justification has been 
argued, with few exceptions, in verificationist terms of 
increased accuracy. Moreover, the vast majority of weigh- 
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ting methods rely on frequentist assessments of inde- 
pendently evolved states, the more homoplasious a 
character is hypothesized to be the more it is down-weigh- 
ted. But, independently evolved states by definition are 
historically unique, and there is no basis, aside from essen- 
tialism, for counting hypothesized instances of homoplasy 
as if they were the same. 
Thus, there is a tradeoff. The student of phylogenetic 
inference has to decide between real increased knowledge 
or presumed accuracy. I am inclined to go with soph- 
isticated falsification and research cycles, because of their 
scientific character, greater coherence and generality, and 
the expansive nature of the research program they offer. 
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